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ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN AND CONFLICT OF LAWS
JOHN W. ESTERt
Although there are many areas in which rules of law reflect current
feelings of moral and social policy, few justiciable controversies call
for the determination of such factors as directly as does a case involving
the legal status and rights of an illegitimate child. This is particularly
true where one state is called upon to determine the status of an illegiti-
mate who was born or has been domiciled in another state prior to
migration to the forum. In such situations the policy of the forum might
conflict sharply with that of the state in which the parents attempted
to "legitimate" the child. And in making a choice as to which law should
properly be applied, the court's decision will determine not only the legal
rights of the child, but to a significant degree will also affect the child's
social status and his own personal feelings in regard to the stigma placed
upon him by his parents.
The early common law treatment of the illegitimate child showed a
marked disregard for these social implications. Based on the refusal of
the Earls and Barons in 1235 to provide for legitimation of a child born
out of wedlock,' Lord Chief Justice Tindal was able to state in Birtwhistle
v. Vardill" that ". . . the rule of descent to English land is, that the heir
must be born after actual marriage of his father and mother . . . and
. . . this is a rule of a positive inflexible nature, applying to and
inherent in the land itself which is the subject of descent. . . ." The
fact that the claimant had acquired a status of legitimacy according to
the laws of Scotland was held to be wholly immaterial. Under the law of
England, one seeking rights of inheritance must have been born during
lawful wedlock, and his status in another country was of no consequence.
This unyielding refusal on the part of the early common law courts to give
any legal recognition to an illegitimate was succinctly described by Black-
stone when he wrote that such a child's ". . . rights are very few, being
only such as he can acquire, for he can inherit nothing, being looked
upon as the son of nobody, and sometimes called filius nullius, sometimes
t Assistant Professor, University of Maryland Law School.
1. "He is a Bastard that is born before the Marriage of his parents." 20 Hen. 3,
ch. 9, 1 Stat. at Large 31 (1235). In the "Statute of Merton," it was also noted that
"... all the Earls and Barons with one voice answered, that they would not change
the Laws of the Realm, which hitherto have been used and approved."
2. 7 C. & F. 895, 934, 7 Eng. Rep. 1308, 1322 (1840).
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filius populi." 3 In fact, children born out of wedlock continued to be
regarded in England as bastards for life until the Legitimacy Act of 1926
finally made provision for legitimation by the subsequent intermarriage
of the child's parents.'
While England was slow to recognize a potential in an illegitimate
child to acquire a status of full legitimacy, the American law developed
with greater rapidity, and only a few instances of adherence to the strict
common law principle may be cited. For example, in 1895 the Florida
Supreme Court declared that ". . . legitimation in a foreign country does
not make lawful heirs, in other countries, where the common law or the
statute of Merton is now in force, of those who were born out of lawful
marriage."5 And in Smith v. Derr's Adm'rs,6 the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court refused to depart from common law precedents, stating that "so
far as our law is concerned, legitimation by the subsequent marriage of
the parents abroad, by act of a foreign legislature or by judicial decree
abroad, are all fruitless." Fortunately, such cancerous doctrines did not
become malignant, and all fifty states have recognized the inequity of
an indelible status of illegitimacy by providing for some form of legitima-
tion after birth.
1. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The usual conflict of laws case involving an illegitimate child arises
as follows: An illegitimate child is born in State A, and while domiciled
in that state, or in State B, the parents do an act which would have the
effect of legitimating the child according to the law of that jurisdiction.
The parents then move to the forum where the father eventually dies,
or perhaps they are domiciled in another state at the time of his death,
and he leaves real or personal property in the forum. Claiming a right
of inheritance from or through his father, the child proves that he has
been legitimated according to the law of another state, and alleges that the
foreign created status of legitimacy should be recognized and given full
effect in the forum. The "conflict" in such a case is generally due to the
fact that the legitimation statute of the forum is different than that of
State A or State B. This section will attempt to point out the lack of
uniformity in statutory provisions which gives rise to such conflict of
laws cases.
3. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 458.
4. 16 & 17 Geo. 5, ch. 60 (1926).
5. Williams v. Kimball, 35 Fla. 49, 54, 16 So. 783, 784 (1895).
6. 34 Pa. St. 126 (1859), rejected as authority in Moretti's Estate, 16 D. & C. 715
(1932). For a similar case in Illinois, see Stoltz v. Doering, 112 Ill. 234, 239-40 (1885).
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Although not properly classified as "legitimation" statutes, the
provisions in Arizona and Oregon deserve special attention due to the
sweeping nature of their application.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-206 (1956):
Legitimacy of children; power to inherit
A. Every child is the legitimate child of its natural parents and
is entitled to support and education as if born in lawful wedlock,
except that he is not entitled to the right to dwell or reside with
the family of his father, if the father is married.
B. Every child shall inherit from its natural parents and from
their kindred heir, lineal and collateral, in the same manner as
children born in lawful wedlock.
C. This section shall apply although the natural father of such
child is married to a woman other than the mother of the child,
as well as when he is single. (Emphasis added.)
ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.060 (1959):
Legal status and legal relationships where parents not married.
The legal status and legal relationships and the rights and obli-
gations between a person and his descendants, and between a
person and his parents, their descendants and kindred, are the
same for all persons, whether or not the parents have been
married. (Emphasis added.)
As can be seen from the face of these statutes, the only act necessary to
make a child legitimate in relation to his natural parents and their
collaterals is the act of birth itself. These states stand alone in requiring
nothing other than birth to make a child legitimate.
A far more common statutory provision may be found in those
states which have adopted the civil law concept of legitimation per
subsequens matrimonium. With the exception of Kansas (and Arizona
and Oregon where such a statute is unnecessary), all fifty states have
such a statute, and these enactments may be categorized according to the
presence or absence of the requirement of acknowledgment; some pro-
viding for legitimation by subsequent marriage alone,7 others requiring
7. ALASKA ComP. LAWS. ANN. § 21-3-3 (Supp. 1957); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-103
(1947) ; CAL. CIV. CODE § 230; CAL. PROB. CODE § 256; CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 45-274
(1958); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 742.091 (Supp. 1957); HAWAII REv. LAWS. § 57-24 (1955);
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-1006 (1947) ; IOWA CODE ANN. § 595.18 (1950) ; Mr. REv. STAT.
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marriage plus acknowledgment of paternity.8 The Wisconsin legislation
is illustrative of the former, and the Illinois statute of the latter.
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 245.36 (1957):
In any and every case where the father and mother of an illegiti-
mate child or children shall lawfully intermarry . . . such child
or children shall thereby become legitimated and enjoy all the
rights and privileges of legitimacy as if they had been born
during the wedlock of their parents.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 163 (1959):
An illegitimate child whose parents intermarry and who is
acknowledged by the father as the father's child shall be con-
sidered legitimate.
Included in the second category, requiring marriage plus acknowledgment,
the Louisiana act provides that the acknowledgment must be before a
notary and witnesses,9 and in Delaware' and Massachusetts" acknowl-
edgment is not required if paternity is established by adjudication. It
should also be noted that only Pennsylvania requires marriage plus
cohabitation, 2 while in the District of Columbia the only subsequent
marriage provision appears in the chapter on vital statistics.
1 8
The second most common statutory provision is one enabling the
child to inherit from or through his father, or granting full legitimacy,
if the father has acknowledged paternity. While such a statute appears
in one form or another in twenty of the fifty states, the requirements of
ANN. ch. 170, § 3 (1954); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (153) (Supp. 1957); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 517.19 (1959); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-123 (1947); NED. REV. STAT.
§ 13-109 (1954); NEV. REv. STAT. §§ 122.140, 134.170 (1) (1959); N. M. STAT. ANN.
§ 29-1-20 (1953); N.Y. Dom. REL. LAW § 24; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-12 (Supp. 1959);
N.D. CENTURY CODE § 14-09-02 (1960) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 2 (1951) ; PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 20, §§ 1.7 (b), 301.14 (1950), 180.14 (7) (Supp. 1958); S.C. CODE § 15-1384
(1952); S.D. CODE § 14.0301 (1939) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-307 (1955); TEX. PROD.
CODE § 42 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-60-14 (1953) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 26.04.060
(1951) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 4085 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 245.36 (1957).
8. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 10 (1958); COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 152-2-8 (1953);
GA. CODE ANN. § 74-101 (1948); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 163 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT.
§ 6-207 (b) (2) (Burns 1953); Ky. REv. STAT. § 391.090 (3) (1959); LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 198 (West 1952); MD. ANN. CODE art. 46, § 6 (1957); MIss. CODE ANN.
§ 474 (1957) ; Mo. ANN. STAT. § 474.070 (1949) ; N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 457:42 (1955) ;
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:15-1 (1960), § 3A:4-7 (1953); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.18
(Page 1953) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-21, 33-1-8 (1956) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14,
§ 554 (1959); VA. CODE ANN. § 64-6 (1950); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 2-44 (1957).
9. LA. REv. STAT. § 9:391 (1950).
10. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1301 (1953).
11. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 190, § 7 (1955).
12. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48, § 167 (Supp. 1958).
13. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-963 (Supp. 1959).
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such statutes are far from uniform, and only one of the several differing
provisions may be quoted as illustrative of even a small number of states.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 255:
Illegitimate children; inheritance rights; limitations
Every illegitimate child is an heir . . . of the person who, in
writing, signed in the presence of a competent witness, acknowl-
edges himself to be the father, and inherits his or her estate, in
whole or in part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if
he had been born in lawful wedlock; but he does not represent
his father by inheriting any part of the estate of his father's
kindred, either lineal or collateral, unless, before his death, his
parents shall have intermarried, and his father, after such mar-
riage, acknowledges him as his child, or adopts him into his
family; in which case such child is deemed legitimate for all
purposes of succession. (Emphasis added.)
While similar provisions have been enacted in nine other states,'4 this is
the only statute dealing with acknowledgment where there is even this
degree of uniformity. For the sake of convenience, the remaining pro-
visions will be listed without quotation.
1. Acknowledgment is sufficient.5 (1 state)
2. Open and notorious acknowledgment.' (3 states)
3. Acknowledgment in writing.' (3 states)
4. Written acknowledgment required, but the illegitimate still
does not inherit from his father. 8 (1 state)
5. In writing before witnesses.' (1 state)
6. In writing and before witnesses, but the child still does not
inherit through his parents.20 (1 state)
14. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.29 (Supp. 1960) ;. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 14-104 (1947) ;
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 91-404 (1947); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 56-01-05 (1960);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 215 (1951); S.D. CODE § 56.0105 (1939) ; WASH. REv. CODE
§ 11.04.080 (1951); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 237.06 (Supp. 1960). In Nebraska, the statute
is similar to that in California, except for the additional requirement that the parents
have other children. NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-109 (1956).
15. UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-4-10 (1953).
16. IOwA CODE ANN. § 636.46 (1950); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1949);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-109 (1954).
17. IOWA CODE ANN. § 636.46 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1949);
NEB. REv. STAT. § 13-109 (1954).
13. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1304 (1953).
19. NEv. REv. STAT. § 134.170(1) (1959).
20. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 525.172 (1947).
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7. Written acknowledgment executed before the court or filed
with the court.21 (1 state)
8. Executed before a notary or justice of the peace.22 (1 state)
9. Filed with the court and executed with the formalities of a
deed.2" (1 state)
10. Execution before an officer entitles the child to support.24
(1 state)
In addition to the two methods of legitimation discussed above,
several miscellaneous provisions need to be mentioned in order to com-
plete the picture. In several states legitimacy may be established by means
of an expressly authorized judicial proceeding.25 In Louisiana a notarial
act before two witnesses is sufficient,26 and in Wisconsin an admission
of paternity in open court will have the same effect.27 Finally, in seven
states a father may "adopt" his illegitimate child and thereby legitimate
him as of the time of birth.2' The latter provision in regard to "adoption"
of an illegitimate child is of particular importance, and the Oklahoma
legislation may be given as illustrative of the almost identical provisions
in the other six states.29
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 55 (1951):
The father of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging it
as his own, receiving it as such, with the consent of his wife, if
he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if it
were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such child
is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time
of its birth. (Emphasis added.)
Of all the statutes investigated, only two reflected a policy of giving
21. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 11 (1940).
22. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 170, § 3 (1954).
23. MICH. STAT. ANN. § 27.3178 (153) (Supp. 1957).
24. HAWAII REV. LAWS § 330-12 (1955).
25. ALASKA Colwp. LAWS. ANN. § 21-3-2 (1957); GA. CODE ANN. § 74-103 (1948);
IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 6-207 (b) (1) (Burns 1953), 44-109 (Burns 1952) ; IOWA CODE ANN.§ 636.46 (1950) ; KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 59-501 (1949); MISS. CODE ANN. § 1269-01
(1956); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-4-12 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-10 (1950); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2105.18 (Page 1953); S.C. CODE § 15-1384 (1952) ; TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 36-301, -303, -306 (1955) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 237.06 (Supp. 1960).
26. LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 200 (West 1952).
27. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 237.06 (Supp. 1960).
28. CAL. CIV. CODE § 230; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 16-1510 (1947); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 61-136 (1947); N.D. CENTURY CODE § 14-11-15 (1960); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
10, § 55 (1951); S.D. CODE ANN. § 14.0408 (1939) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-30-12 (1953).
29. The "thereby adopts" statute in Montana was among those sections mentioned
as repealed by the Uniform Adoption Act, but the editors of the statutes seemed to
indicate that it might still be effective.
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full recognition to a status of legitimacy created in another state. Section
29-18 of the North Carolina General Statutes (Supp. 1959), pro-
vides that where a child has been legitimated by the laws of that state,
or ". . . in accordance with the applicable law of any other jurisdic-
tion . . .," he shall be entitled to inherit from and through his parents,
and his parents from and through him, as though born in lawful wedlock.
In Oregon, section 111.231 of the Revised Statutes (1959), suggests
the same result by providing that "in applying the laws of descent and
distribution of this state, full effect shall be given to all relationships
as described in ORS 109.060."3o In view of the pervasiveness of legisla-
tion on the subject of illegitimacy and legitimation, it is strange, and
perhaps unfortunate, that only two states have provided by statute for
the recognition of a status of legitimacy acquired under the laws of
another state.
2. JUDICIAL DEVELOPMENTS
Before attempting to deal with the more important conflict of laws
problems arising out of the multifarious statutory methods for legitima-
tion, it is necessary to indicate those areas which will not be discussed.
First, legitimation by judicial proceeding and by special legislative act
have rarely been presented in a conflict of laws context, and will not be
considered. Second, our inquiry will be confined to the problems pre-
sented where a child is admittedly illegitimate, and we will not delve into
the issue as to whether or not a child is legitimate at the time of birth.
Third, the rule stated in section 139 of the Restatement of Conflicts has
become obsolete and may be disposed of in summary fashion. According
to the Restatement, and Professor Beale,3 an act performed after the
birth of an illegitimate child will not relate back to the time of birth and
make the child legitimate ab initio unless the law of ". . . the state of
domicil of that parent at the time of the child's birth and the law of the
parent's domicil at the time of the legitimating act so provide."3 2 No
recent case can be found supporting such a requirement, and this writer
joins Professor Rabel in his suggestion that it is an artificial doctrine
based on a "preconceived idea" unsupported by any ". American
"133decision of actual importance.
30. OmL RE V. STAT. § 109.060 (1959) was quoted in full in section 1 of this article.
31. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 707 (1935).
32. RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 139 (1934).
33. 1 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 614 (2d ed. 1958). See
also, STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 334 (2d ed. 1951). One of the few cases seeming
to support the Restatement view is Fowler v. Fowler, 131 N.C. 169, 42 S.E. 563 (1902).
However, both elements were present in this case (birth and legitimation in Illinois),
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Turning to those areas which are of greater importance today, it
would seem proper to briefly outline the general principles involved before
applying them to specific problems arising out of statutory provisions.
(1) The status of a child may fall within any one of five classifica-
tions; legitimate, illegitimate, illegitimate but capable of inheriting from
one or both parents, legitimated, or recognized as a natural child under
civil law concepts. Of these five, it is most important to keep in mind
the distinction between an illegitimate child who has been fully legitimated
and one who has acquired only a right to inherit from or through his
parents.
(2) The law of the domicil of a decedent governs the question of
those entitled to distribution of his personal property, and the law of the
situs controls in regard to real property."4
(3) An illegitimate child fully legitimated by the law of the domicil
of the parent whose relationship to the child is in question, is generally
regarded as legitimate everywhere.35 To this general rule must be tacked
the caveat that the forum might not recognize a foreign legitimation
which is contrary to its own concepts of public policy.3"
(4) If the child has been fully legitimated according to the law of
the domicil of his parent, it is immaterial that the law of the child's own
domicil would not have this effect."
(5) An act done which is sufficient to legitimate under the laws of
the state where performed, will not legitimate where such act is not
sufficient under the laws of the domicil of any of the parties involved.38
It is also doubtful whether an attempted act of legitimation will be given
effect in a foreign jurisdiction where such act is sufficient only in the
state of the child's domicil."9
and it does not lend as much support as would a case where one element was lacking
and the child was not permitted to inherit for this reason.
34. Jones v. Jones, 234 U.S. 615 (1914); Lopes v. Downey, 334 Mass. 161, 134
N.E.2d 131 (1956) ; Matter of Crabbe's Estate, 158 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Surr. Ct. 1957)
Napier Y. Church, 132 Tenn. 111, 177 S.W. 56 (1915).
35. Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243 (1880) ; ln re Craven's Estate, 268 P.2d 236
(Okla. 1954) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 137, 140 (1934).
36. Fuhrhop v. Austin, 385 Ill. 149, 52 N.E.2d 267 (1943), cert. denied 321 U.S.
796 (1944) ; Cole v. Taylor, 132 Tenn. 92, 177 S.W. 61 (1915) ; 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 712 (1935).
37. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 711-12 (1935); STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS
332 (2d ed. 1951).
38. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 435 (3d ed. 1949). Contra, Smith v. Mitchell,
185 Tenn. 57, 202 S.W.2d 979 (1947).
39. Irving v. Ford, 183 Mass. 448, 67 N.E. 366 (1903); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 137, caveat (1934). In Moretti's Estate, 16 D. & C. 715, 719 (Pa. 1932), the
Pennsylvania court held that ". . . the status of Pietro was determined by the law
of his domicile, and he is, therefore, entitled to his father's estate." (Emphasis added.)
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(6) Where the act of a parent in a foreign jurisdiction did not fully
legitimate the child in that state or country, but only resulted in a right
to inherit from that parent, such act will generally be disregarded in other
jurisdictions."
(7) If the forum characterizes its own legitimation statute as one
of succession, an illegitimate may be permitted to inherit local property,
both real and personal, without consideration of the law of the parent's
domicil at the time of the alleged legitimating act.4
(8) The United States is unique in holding that "a legitimate
relationship may exist between a child and one parent although its
relationship to the other parent is an illegitimate one."42
This outline of basic conflict of laws rules applied in cases invloving
illegitimate children is necessarily general, and admittedly too sweeping
and all inclusive. The many qualifications and exceptions will be dealt
with in the sections to follow.
A. Legitimation per Subsequens Matrvnonim
". . .manna to the bastards of the world" ?43
Of the several methods whereby an illegitimate child may become
legitimate, that of legitimation per subsequens matrimonin is most com-
mon, existing in all but one state.44 Due possibly to the fact that such a
statute is usually present both at the forum and at the domicil of the
parents at the time of their marriage, there has been little deviation from
the general principles listed above. Thus, if the parents subsequently
marry, and according to the law of their domicil at that time, the ceremony
has the effect of legitimating the child, he will generally be deemed
legitimate wherever he might go.45  Should either of his parents die
intestate leaving realty or personalty in another jurisdiction, he will be
This is apparently the only case specifically holding that legitimation under the law of
the child's domicil is sufficient although the law of the father's domicil was not satisfied.
40. GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 445 (3d ed. 1949); 1 WHARTON, CONFLICT OF
LAWS 552-54 (3d ed. 1905).
41. In re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945) ; STUMBERG, CONFLICT
OF LAWS 333 (2d ed. 1951).
42. 1 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 601-02 (2d ed. 1958);
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 137, comment a (1934).
43. This quaint aphorism was coined by the California court to describe its sub-
sequent marriage statute. Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 563, 31 Pac. 915, 917 (1892).
44. See statutes cited notes 7-13 supra.
45. Milton v. Escue, rev'd on other grounds, 201 Md. 190, 93 A.2d 258 (1952)
Doty v. Vensel, 190 Okla. 461, 124 P.2d 982 (1942); Pilgrim v. Griffin, 237 S.W.2d
448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950); 1 RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 617
(2d ed. 1958).
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entitled to inherit as a legitimate heir.46 And even though his father may
die domiciled in a state other than that where legitimation by subsequent
marriage occurred, he will nevertheless be entitled to recover under his
father's life insurance policy.47 In addition, the rule recognizing such a
foreign legitimation applies in favor of the parents as well as the child.
Thus, it is unnecessary for the parents to institute judicial proceedings to
establish legitimacy, because a legitimate child cannot be legitimated,
and the forum will recognize the status acquired in the state of the
parent's former domicil. 8 Another situation in which the forum might
extend such recognition to the parents is illustrated in the rather unusual
case of Skeadas v. Sklaroff.4 After giving birth to an illegitimate child
in Rhode Island, the mother consented to a proposed adoption by de-
fendants and gave them custody of the child. More than four years later
the defendants filed a petition in Rhode Island to adopt the child, where-
upon the natural parents immediately went through a marriage ceremony
in Massachusetts (the state of their domicil). Before the words of the
preacher had faded away, they filed suit in Rhode Island to obtain custody
of their child, alleging that he had been legitimated due to the Massachu-
setts marriage, and any adoption in Rhode Island would be of no effect
without the consent of the legitimate father. Applying the same conflict
of laws rule which enables a legitimated child to inherit in the forum,
the court held that the natural parents were entitled to custody because
the child had been legitimated.
However, it would be misleading to say that a subsequent marriage
which legitimates according to the law of the parent's domicil always has
the same effect in another state. While it is of no consequence that the
forum does not have a subsequent marriage statute,"0 the legitimated child
must always contend with the general rules in regard to choice of law
where inheritance to movables or immovables is involved. In addition,
he might be met with the argument that the foreign legitimation is con-
trary to the public policy of the forum and should not be recognized.
Where the latter contention is upheld, it is interesting to note that the
courts place particular emphasis on the former-the law of the situs of
46. Dayton v. Adkisson, 45 N.J. Eq. 603, 17 AtI. 964 (1889); Bates v. Virolet,
33 App. Div. 436, 53 N.Y. Supp. 893 (1898); Miller v. Miller, 91 N.Y. 315 (1883);
Matter of Crabbe's Estate, 158 N.Y.S.2d 551 (Surr. Ct. 1957).
47. It re Clark's Estate, 177 Misc. 397, 30 N.Y.S.2d 751 (Surr. Ct. 1941).
48. Fowler v. Fowler, 131 N.C. 169, 42 S.E. 563 (1902).
49. 84 R.I. 206, 122 A.2d 444 (1956), stay granted, 351 U.S. 171, cert. denied, 351
U.S. 988 (1956).
50. Fowler v. Fowler, 131 N.C. 169, 42 S.E. 563 (1902) ; Valley v. Lambuth, 1
Tenn. App. 547 (1925).
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land determines who may inherit, and the domicil of the decedent controls
in regard to personalty. Two Illinois cases are representative of a forum's
possible attitude where such an issue is raised. In Peirce v. Peirce,5 the
illegitimate children of a bigamous marriage claimed a right to inherit
from an Illinois decedent. To support an allegation of legitimation, the
children proved that their father had obtained a divorce from his first
wife after they were born to the second, and according to the law of
Nevada where all parties were then domiciled, a common law marriage
arose from the ashes of the Nevada divorce. Looking to the law of that
state, the children pointed out that a subsequent common law marriage
is effective to legitimate previously born illegitimate children. Although
common law marriages are not recognized in Illinois, the court permitted
the children to inherit, stating that "it is not against the public policy of
this State to recognize legitimacy conferred by the law of Nevada, al-
though the method whereby legitimacy is there obtained is not available
in Illinois. ' ' 2 The court then stressed the point that the question involved
was the legitimacy of the children, and not the validity of the common
law marriage.
The second Illinois case of importance in regard to the issue of the
forum's public policy is that of Fuhrhop v. AustinY. In this case the child
was also the issue of a bigamous marriage, but the father did not attempt
to divorce one of his wives and the child could not establish a valid
common law marriage. However, in Arkansas a child born of a
bigamous marriage is deemed legitimate, and the claimant argued that he
should be regarded as legitimate in Illinois due to his status under the
law of Arkansas where his parents were domiciled at the time of the
bigamous marriage. His claim was rejected; the court pointing out that
the descent of real property is governed by the law of the situs, and it is
against the public policy of Illinois to permit the issue of a bigamous
marriage to succeed to Illinois land. Although the decision of the court
was supported by the few cases directly in point, 4 an early Louisiana case
51. 379 Ill. 185, 39 N.E.2d 990 (1942).
52. Peirce v. Peirce, supra note 51, at 189, 39 N.E.2d at 992. The position taken
in the Peirce case was recently reaffirmed in Jambrone v. David, 16 II1. 2d 32, 156 N.E.2d
569 (1959). Accord, Milton v. Escue, 201 Md. 190, 93 A.2d 258 (1952) ; McArthur v.
Hall, 169 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. Civ. App. 1943).
53. 385 Ill. 149, 52 N.E.2d 267 (1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 796 (1944).
54. Olmsted v. Olmsted, 216 U.S. 386 (1910), affirming, 190 N.Y. 458 (1908) ; In
re Bruington's Estate, 160 Misc. 34, 289 N.Y. Supp. 725 (Surr. Ct. 1936). Contra.
George Estate, 4 Pa. D. & C.2d 334, 338 (1955), wherein the court reasoned that ". . . a
recognition of the status of a child born of a bigamous union does not involve a
recognition of the lawfulness of the conduct of the parents. The statute concerns itself
simply and exclusively with the rights of the innocent children."
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apparently rejected the public policy qualification to the general rule.
In Caballero v. The Executor," a negro woman and a caucasian man had
an illegitimate child in Louisiana. The parents then acquired a domicil
in Havana and were later married. Although miscegenation was clearly
against the public policy of Louisiana in 1872, the child was permitted to
inherit in that state because of the legitimation in the country where the
parents were domiciled when married. While this case should not be
overlooked merely because of its date, it seems to have little weight today
due to the pervasive view that the policy of the forum will control where
a case revolves around a claim of right to inherit local property." Thus,
it is possible that the forum might recognize a status of legitimacy
acquired due to the subsequent marriage of the parents in another juris-
diction, but at the same time refuse to permit the legitimated child to
inherit local property due to domestic concepts of "public policy."'57
The case of Smith v. MV1itchell5s deserves special mention because it
falls within neither the general rule looking to the domicil of the parents
or the public policy qualification just discussed. In the Mitchell case an
illegitimate child was born in Tennessee prior to the marriage of his
parents in Alabama. In 1947 Tennessee had no subsequent marriage
statute, although Alabama did. Despite the fact that all parties, father,
mother and illegitimate child, were domiciled in Tennessee at the time of
birth, at the time of the subsequent marriage, and when the father died,
the illegitimate child was permitted to inherit in Tennessee due to the
marriage of his parents in Alabama."5 The court reached this result by
reasoning as follows: (1) It is not necessary to be domiciled in the state
where a marriage is performed in order for the marriage to be valid in
that state and recognized in Tennessee. (2) Since the marriage is valid
in Alabama, and recognized as such in this state, we should look to the
law of Alabama to determine the effect of the marriage. (3) In Alabama,
the marriage had the effect of legitimating previously born illegitimate
children. (4) A child legitimated by the laws of another state should be
permitted to inherit in any state, provided that the law of the foreign state
is not inconsistent with, or opposed to, the policy of the forum. (5) Since
there was no conflict with Tenneccee policy, the court concluded that
55. 24 La. Ann. 573 (1872).
56. Compare Smith v. Mitchell, 185 Tenn. 57, 202 S.W.2d 979 (1947) ; with Cole
v. Taylor, 132 Tenn. 92, 177 S.W. 61 (1915). Note also cases cited supra note 54.
57. After stating the general rule that the forum may refuse to recognize a foreign
legitimation as contrary to its public policy, Professor Beale suggested that "[oln sound
principle there seems no reason for so refusing." 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWs 712 (1935).
58. 185 Tenn. 57, 202 S.W.2d 979 (1947).
59. Accord, Munro v. Munro, 1 Scots App. (Rob.) 492 (H.L. 1840).
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".. . a child born out of wedlock and legitimated by virtue of the law
of a foreign state is permitted to inherit property in Tennessee . . .""
While this case has been criticized for its departure from firmly en-
trenched principles of conflict of laws, and for the court's obvious partici-
pation in judicial legislation,6 ' its result is not shocking nor its reasoning
without merit. If the parents of an illegitimate child wish to remove the
stigma they have placed on their offspring, why should their attempt be
thwarted merely because it was necessary to leave their domicil and be
married in another state? A recognition of the child as legitimate under
such circumstances is consistent with the general conflicts rule that a
marriage valid where celebrated is valid everywhere ;" full effect is given
to the intention of the parents to ameliorate the results of their illicit
conduct; and the child is not punished for the wrong of his parents.
While it might be argued that a state lacks "jurisdiction" to legitimate
where its only contact with the parties is the marriage ceremony,63 that
state certainly has the power to create a status of husband and wife, and
this status will generally be recognized in other states. Why, then, should
it lack power to create a status of legitimacy based on a marriage in the
state? It is both illogical and inconsistent to recognize one status under
the law of another state and disregard the other, when both were created
by a single act.
Before concluding this section on legitimation by subsequent mar-
riage, it must be pointed out that an illegitimate child might be permitted
60. Smith v. Mitchell, supra note 58, at 71, 202 S.W.2d at 985.
61. Note, 20 TENN. L. REV. 202 (1948).
62. The courts are not in complete accord as to which state should determine the
status arising out of a foreign marriage ceremony; the law of the place of marriage,
or that of the state where the parties intend to live as husband and wife. Taintor,
What Law Governs the Ceremony, Incidents & Status of Marriage, 19 B.U.L. Rv. 353(1939), in SELECTED READINGS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS (1956). If the former theory
should be adopted (which was the case in Smith v. Mitchell), there would seem to be no
obstacle to the position taken by the Tennessee court that the law of the place of the
ceremony should determine whether that act also created a status of legitimacy between
the parents and their child. However, if the court had applied the second theory, and
looked to its own law to determine the marital status (since the parties were at all
times domiciled in that state), it must be admitted that a decision in favor of legitimacy
would be more difficult to rationalize. By applying the intended place of domicil theory,
Tennessee would look to its own law to determine the marital status created, and it
would be inconsistent to then apply the law of Alabama to determine the question of
legitimacy. However, since Tennessee did look to the law of Alabama to determine
the validity of the marriage, this writer can see no serious objection to applying the
law of the latter state to determine legitimacy as well.
63. Although the cases generally speak in terms of the law of that state which is
"proper" to create a status of legitimacy, the Restatement speaks in terms of "jurisdic-
tion." RESTATEMAENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 141 (1934). While the use of this term would
undoubtedly be proper where a status of legitimacy is created pursuant to a judicial
proceeding, in non-judicial instances of legitimation it would seem that the question is
not properly one of "jurisdiction."
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to inherit in the forum without consideration of the law of the state of
the parent's domicil at the time of marriage. Buttressed by the general
conflicts rules in regard to distribution of personalty and succession
to realty, several courts have characterized the subsequent marriage
statute in their state as one of succession, and have applied it with little
or no thought of any other law which might also be applicable."4 By mak-
ing such a characterization, the Supreme Court of Illinois, in Hall v. Gab-
bert,65 permitted inheritance of Illinois land under the following cir-
cumstances: Daisy was born illegitimate in Ohio, and her father and
mother were married in that state shortly after bastardy proceedings were
instituted. Having done his duty, the father left Ohio immediately after
the wedding, eventually dying domiciled in California and leaving realty
in Illinois. While in Indiana and California, the father acknowledged
paternity, so that the provisions of the Illinois statute requiring marriage
plus acknowledgment were both met, although not in the same state.
After characterizing the Illinois statute as one of succession, and con-
cluding that it should be applied in regard to inheritance of local land,
the court stated that ". . . it is immaterial what the laws of Indiana or
Ohio, or any other country, are or were. We look to our own law, and
read it as it is written; then to the facts, and, if the facts bring the
claimant within our law, then he is entitled to its benefits, whatever may
be his status elsewhere."66 A similar result was reached in Maine in the
case of In Re Crowell's Estate.6" After the birth of an illegitimate in
Nova Scotia, the parents married and adopted the child while domiciled
in that country. Unfortunately, neither act was of any legal significance
in Nova Scotia. The father later moved to Maine, and upon his death
the child claimed a right of inheritance. According to the general rule,
a child legitimated under the law of his parent's domicil is legitimate
everywhere. And the Maine court felt that the converse might also be
true-if not legitimated by the laws of the parent's domicil, the child
should not be deemed legitimate elsewhere. Accepting this as the proper
64. Wolf v. Gall, 32 Cal. App. 286, 163 Pac. 346 (1917) ; In re Estate of Engelhardt,
272 Wis. 275, 75 N.W.2d 631 (1956). Semble, Franklin v. Lee, 30 Ind. App. 31, 62 N.E.
78 (1901) ; Pilgrim v. Griffin, 237 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1950). In Wolf v. Gall,
the Supreme Court of California denied an application for rehearing, stating that
". .. we are not entirely in accord with all the reasoning by which that conclusion is
reached by that court." 32 Cal. App. 286, 296, 163 Pac. 350, 351 (1917). However, the
court gave no reasons for its refusal to fully concur.
65. 213 Ill. 208, 72 N.E. 806 (1904). ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 39, § 3 (1903), was the
same in 1904 as the present ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 163 (1959), except for unimportant
differences in wording.
66. Hall v. Gabbert, supra note 65, at 216, 72 N.E. at 809.
67. 124 Me. 71, 126 At]. 178 (1924).
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rule to be applied, and refusing to recognize the child as legitimate, the
court nevertheless permitted him to inherit. Although this result might
seem strained in view of the court's refusal to recognize a status of legiti-
macy, the reasoning used was consistent with generally accepted conflicts
rules. The forum's law was held to be determinative in regard to distribu-
tion of the personal estate of the domiciliary decedent. Maine's sub-
sequent marriage statute was then characterized as one of succession as
well as legitimation, and since the conditions of that statute were met,
the child was permitted to inherit although he ". . remains an illigiti-
mate.""8 Obviously such cases as Hall v. Gabbert and In Re Crowell's
Estate reflect a tolerant attitude toward the plight of an illegitimate child.
But such an attitude is to be encouraged, particularly where it is con-
sistent with the policy of the forum and may be effectuated by means
of settled conflicts rules permitting the forum to characterize its own
statutes which touch upon inheritance of local property.
B. Legitimation by Acts Other than Marriage
(1) Subsequent acknowledgment of paternity. Where a father has
attempted to legitimate his child by acknowledging paternity, a sister
state will generally give this effect to his act if it was sufficient to
legitimate according to the law of his domicil at the time he acted ;6 and
this is so even though the forum may have no such statute.7" The real
problem involved where legitimation is claimed under such a provision is
one of characterization-is the statute one of legitimation, giving the
child a status of full legitimacy, or one of succession, giving him only a
right to inherit from his father? The prevailing view seems to be in
favor of succession rather than legitimation. 71  Moen v. Moen' is
illustrative of this point. While domiciled in Norway, father Moen
executed a written document acknowledging paternity of his illegitimate
child. The law of Norway attached no legal significance to this act, but
the South Dakota court characterized its own acknowledgment statute
68. I; re Crowell's Estate, supra note 67, at 73, 126 Atl. at 179.
69. Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1930) ; Irving v. Ford, 183 Mass.
448, 67 N.E. 366 (1903) ; It re Slater's Estate, 195 Misc. 713, 90 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Surr. Ct.
1949).
70. In re Slater's Estate, supra note 69.
71. Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1930) ; It re Lloyd's Estate, 170
Cal. 85, 148 Pac. 522 (1915) ; Blythe v. Ayres, 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915 (1892) ; Van
Horn v. Van Horn, 107 Iowa 247, 77 N.W. 846 (1899) ; In re Wehr's Estate, 96 Mont.
245, 29 P.2d 836 (1934). Semble, Doty v. Vensel, 190 Okla. 461, 124 P.2d 982 (1942) ;
is re Beckman's Estate, 160 Wash. 669, 295 Pac. 942 (1931). Contra, In re Slater's
Estate, 195 Misc. 713, 90 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Surr. Ct. 1949) (Forum characterizing statute
of a sister state).
72. 16 S.D. 210, 92 N.W. 13 (1902).
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as one of succession and permitted the child to inherit local realty. In so
holding, the court made this rather interesting statement:
It may be conceded that he [father Moen] neither knew nor
intended that its execution would confer upon the child the right
to inherit his property in any jurisdiction. Nevertheless, it had
the effect of furnishing the proof required by the laws of this
jurisdiction to establish the fact that he was the father of the
child, and such fact being thus established makes her an heir of
her deceased father, and entitled to the land in controversy.73
To the same effect is the case of Blythe v. Ayres,7 where the California
court characterized its acknowledgment statute as one of succession "pure
and simple," holding that ". . . the plaintiff is entitled to all the benefits
of it, regardless of domicile, status or extraterritorial operation of state
laws."
It should be noted that in both Moen v. Moen and Blythe v. Ayres,
the forum had a statute providing for legitimation by acknowledgment,
while the foreign jurisdiction involved did not. If we should reverse the
facts, placing the only acknowledgment provision in the foreign jurisdic-
tion, the child might be denied the right to inherit in the forum. For
example: If a father acknowledges paternity while domiciled in State A,
and according to that state's construction of its statute it is one of
succession only, the forum will probably accept this characterization and
conclude that the child has acquired only a right of inheritance. Since
he has not been fully legitimated by the law of the state where his father
was domiciled when acknowledgment occurred, the forum may refuse to
recognize any right to inherit local property.7 6 Due to the possibility of
such a decision, it might be suggested to those courts truly interested in
the elimination of an indelible status of illegitimacy, that the acknowl-
edgment provision in their particular state be characterized as one of
legitimation as well as succession. If such a characterization is made, a
domiciliary illegitimate liti'gating in another state the question of the legal
effect of his father's acknowledgment, will be able to prove a status
73. Moen v. Moen, supra note 72, at 218, 92 N.W. at 16.
74. 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915 (1892).
75. Blythe v. Ayres, supra note 74, at 582, 31 Pac. at 924.
76. Pfeifer v. Wright, 41 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1930). Professor Goodrich has
stated this rule as follows: "If the law governing the inheritance gives no rights to the
illegitimate unless there is actual legitimation, he will gain nothing from the fact that
the law of the place of recognition does allow inheritance, even though at that time the
parties were domiciled there." GOODRICH, CONFLICT OF LAws 445 (3d ed. 1949).
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of full legitimacy which will be given due recognition and effect."
(2) Legitinotion by "adoption." Although only seven states have
statutes providing for legitimation by "adoption," 8 several of the leading
conflict of laws cases have been based on a claim of legitimation under
such provisions. One such case is that of In Re Presley's Estate."9 While
domiciled in Tennessee, father Presley acknowledged paternity, accepted
his illegitimate child into his family with the consent of his wife, and
treated the child in all respects as though legitimate. According to the law
of Tennessee, these acts were of no legal consequence, but under the law
of Oklahoma where Presley Sr. died a domiciliary, they were sufficient
to legitimate. In holding that Presley Jr. could not inherit from his father
in Oklahoma, the court applied the general rule looking to the law of
the father's domicil at the time of his alleged legitimating acts, and found
that a status of legitimacy had not been created in Tennessee. The court
then indicated that where a child has not been legitimated according to
the law of the father's domicil, the act of moving to another state will not
create such a status, regardless of the fact that the child would be deemed
legitimate had the acts occurred in the latter state.80
As authority for its position that the law of the father's domicil is
determinative in regard to legitimation, the court in the Presley case cited
Blythe v. Ayres, 8" perhaps the most important single case dealing with
conflict of laws and illegitimate children. In this early California case,
father Blythe sired an illegitimate daughter while in England. At the
time of birth, and at all times up to and including the time of his death,
Blythe was domiciled in California. Although he had never married,
and his daughter did not come to California until after his death, she
claimed a right to his rather large estate by reason of alleged acts
sufficient to meet the requirements of section 230 of California's Civil
Code."2 In holding that all of the requirements of this section were
satisfied, thus legitimating the daughter and entitling her to all of her
father's estate, the court had several rather difficult hurdles to jump.
77. In Pfeifer v. Wright, supra note 76, the Kansas cases had characterized the
acknowledgment statute of that state as one of succession, and the Circuit Court in
Oklahoma refused to allow inheritance in the latter state. On the other hand, in In re
Slater's Estate, 195 Misc. 713, 90 N.Y.S.2d 546 (Surr. Ct. 1949), the New York court
permitted inheritance due to a characterization of the Louisiana statute as one of
legitimation.
78. See note 28 supra.
79. 113 Okla. 160, 240 Pac. 89 (1925).
80. See also, 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWs 711 (1935).
81. 96 Cal. 532, 31 Pac. 915 (1892).
82. The California statute is the same as the Oklahoma provision quoted in full in
section 1 supra.
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First, the statute states that the father "thereby adopts" his illegitimate
child. As a matter of statutory construction, the court reasoned that
"adoption, properly considered, refers to persons who are strangers in
blood; legitimation, to persons where the blood relation exists."83 Thus,
the court concluded, "adopts" means "legitimates." Second, the statute
requires that the father "receive" the child into his "family." Although
Blythe died a bachelor and his daughter did not come to California until
after his death, the court held that he had a constructive family into
which he might constructively receive his English daughter." Hurdle
number three-does the statute apply in favor of a non-resident illegiti-
mate? Although the court was unable to find any authority dealing with
legitimation by subsequent "adoption," it applied and promulgated the
now black-letter rule that legitimation depends upon the law of the
father's domicil at the time of the alleged acts of legitimation." In answer
to the English doctrine of "indelibility of bastardy," the court pointedly
stated:
Legitimation is the creature of legislation. Its existence is solely
dependent upon the law and policy of each particular sov-
ereignty. The law and policy of this state authorize and en-
courage it, and there is no principle upon which California
law and policy, when invoked in California courts, shall be made
to surrender to the antagonistic law and policy of Great
Britain.8"
Thus, although the claimant had no direct contact with California, and
although that state had no particular interest which would be advanced
by the application of its own law rather than that of England, "oceans
furnish[ed] no obstruction to the effect of [California's] wise and
beneficent provisions."8"
Fifty-three years after Florence Blythe was recognized as legitimate
in California, the Supreme Court of that state was again called upon to
determine whether the "beneficent" provisions of its "thereby adopts"
statute would be applied in favor of a non-resident illegitimate. In the
case of In Re Lund's Estate," the requirements of section 230 of the
83. Blythe v. Ayres, supra note 81, at 559, 31 Pac. at 916.
84. Blythe v. Ayres, sapra note 81, at 577-80, 31 Pac. at 922-23.
85. This rule has been applied although the forum has no statute providing for
legitimation by adoption. MeNamara v. McNamara, 303 Ill. 191, 135 N.E. 410 (1922);
Holloway v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 151 Md. 321, 134 Atl. 497 (1926) ; Riddle v.
Peters Trust Co., 147 Neb. 578, 24 N.W.2d 434 (1946).
86. Blythe v. Ayres,*supra note 81, at 575, 31 Pac. at 927.
87. Blythe v. Ayres, supra note 81, at 563, 31 Pac. at 917.
88. 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945).
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Civil Code had been met while all parties were domiciled in Minnesota
and New Mexico. Since the father was not domiciled in California
when the acts of "adoption" occurred, Blythe v. Ayres was of no help, 9
and a new theory was needed. But rather than stop with just one new
theory, the court applied two. Number one: Although section 230 is
primarily a law governing status, it is also a statute of succession.
Therefore, it is applicable to determine who is entitled to inherit property
in California. 0 While there was a similar case holding exactly to the
contrary on the issue of characterization of North Dakota's "thereby
adopts" statute,"' there can be little quarrel with the California court's
decision to characterize its own statute as one of succession as well as
legitimation. Number two: Even though the father had apparently done
nothing in California which would result in legitimation under section
230, his prior acts in Minnesota and New Mexico were sufficient and
continued unrevoked in California. A de facto status was said to be
created while the parties were domiciled in these sister states, and this
status matured in California due to the silence of the father after his
arrival. 2 The second theory was clearly unnecessary due to the court's
characterization of section 230 as a statute of both legitimation and
succession, and it is doubtful whether "legitimation by silence" will escape
from the smog in which it was created."3 In fact, the only real value in
citing this theory at all is to illustrate the point that California's legitima-
tion statutes are indeed "manna to the bastards of the world."
C. The Recognisred Natural Child
The civil law concept providing for the status of a recognized natural
child is unknown to the common law, falling within neither the category
of illegitimate or legitimated. Although there is a lack of uniformity in
civil law jurisdictions as to what is necessary in order to acquire such a
status, 4 for our purposes it may be explained as follows: Even though
the parents of an illegitimate child have never married, the child may
acquire certain rights of inheritance if his parents were capable of mar-
riage at the time he was born, and if they subsequently recognize him as
their child according to the procedure required by the civil code. Having
89. The Lower California court held that the illegitimate could not recover,
applying Blythe v. Ayres, supra note 81, at face value.
90. It re Lund's Estate, supra note 88.
91. Eddie v. Eddie, 8 N.D. 376, 79 N.W. 856 (1899).
92. In re Lund's Estate, supra note 88, at 494-96, 159 P.2d at 655-56.
93. In re Presley's Estate, 113 Okla. 160, 240 Pac. 89 (1925) clearly rejects the
doctrine applied in the Lund case. See also 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAws 711 (1935).
94. Compare P. R. LAws ANN. tit. 31 §§ 504, 506, 2431, 2661 (1954), with LA.
Civ. CoDE ANN. arts. 202-09 (West 1952). And see Note, 15 LA. L. REv. 221 (1954).
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acquired such a status, if it later becomes necessary for him to seek
recognition of his inheritance rights in a common law jurisdiction, he is
faced with the rather difficult task of convincing the court that he should
not be regarded as illegitimate, but should be treated as though he had
been fully legitimated under common law concepts. Unfortunately, his
chances of success are very slim.
The attitude of the American courts toward a claim by a recognized
natural child that his foreign status should be given effect, may be
capsulized by quoting from Professor Beale: "There is no corresponding
status at common law; and in a common-law state therefore this status
has no legal effect."95 Several reasons have been given for such a harsh
rule. First, the civil law of a foreign country can have no extraterritorial
effect upon the devolution of property located in the forum."0 Second,
if recognition is to be given at all, it is because of international comity
only, and should not be extended where contrary to the policy of the
forum or where enforcement would prejudice the rights or interests of
citizens of the forum. 7 Third, "the natural child does not obtain, by
the act of recognition, a status of a legitimate but is merely permitted to
inherit as a 'natural child'."98 Therefore, since not fully legitimated, he
can claim no right to inherit in any country other than that where the
right was granted. Underlying each of these reasons is one obvious
factor. The law under which the child is claiming to have acquired a
status of partial legitimacy does not fit within any of the pigeonholes
developed by the common law, and a new one will not be created. A much
more reasonable position is that taken by Judge Clark in Robles v.
Folsom."'
Since civil law jurisdictions have three categories of children
and New York has only two, the 'acknowledged natural child'
must be likened to either New York 'legitimates' or New York
'bastards.' The chief similarity to the New York bastard, for
purposes of intestate succession, is a mere semantic identity-
neither is labeled 'legitimate.' On the other hand, the acknowl-
edged child is one whom the father claimed as his own with
knowledge that the act would confer on it rights of inheritance
and greater social status.
95. 2 BEALE, CONFLICT OF LAWS 712 (1935).
96. Lopes v. Downey, 334 Mass. 161, 134 N.E.2d 131 (1956).
97. Succession of Petit, 49 La. Ann. 625, 21 So. 717 (1897).
98. In re Vincent's Estate, 189 Misc. 489, 494, 71 N.Y.S.2d 165, 170 (Surr. Ct. 1947).
99. In re Tomacelli-Filomarino's Estate, 189 Misc. 410, 73 N.Y.S.2d 297 (Surr.
Ct. 1947).
100. 239 F.2d 562, 567 (2d Cir. 1956) (dissenting opinion).
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Judge Clark then concluded that common law courts should regard the
acknowledged natural child as though he had been legitimated in accord-
ance with common law principles. By so doing, the court would be stress-
ing the similarities which exist between the two concepts rather than
enlarging upon differences in terminology, and would be giving effect
to the obviously beneficent intent of the parent.
CONCLUSION
No better example can be given of the adaptability of the common
law to fluctuating mores and concepts of social policy, than the progres-
sively more tolerant treatment afforded by common law courts and
legislatures to those children unfortunate enough to be born out of wed-
lock. Recognizing the inequity of an indelible status of illegitimacy,
and realizing that punishment of the illegitimate in no way deters illicit
cohabitation, American legislatures have unanimously rejected the archaic
doctrine embodied in the Statute of Merton. Despite such early common
law precedents branding illegitimates as bastards for life, modern courts
and legislatures have refused to disregard the social environment in which
they function, and have recognized in each illegitimate child a potential
of acquiring a legal status of full legitimacy. In furtherance of this
desirable social end, courts have also endeavorea1 to apply conflict of laws
principles in such a way as to ameliorate the effects of a status of illegiti-
macy which attached to a child born out of wedlock in another state or
country. Thus, the courts will recognize and give full effect to acts of
legitimation effective according to the domicil of the parent, regardless
of whether the subsequently created status of legitimacy arose due to
the marriage of the parents, acknowledgment of paternity, or "adoption"
of the child. In fact, there are only three frequently recurring instances
where a foreign born illegitimate might not receive favorable treatment
in the forum; where some "policy" of the forum is contrary to the law
of the jurisdiction in which the child acquired a status of legitimacy,
where the foreign law resulted in the creation of only a right to inherit
and not a status of full legitimacy, and where the child has become a
recognized natural child in a civil law jurisdiction.
There would seem to be little justification for even these few in-
stances where a forum might act unfavorably in response to a child's
attempt to establish legitimacy. In regard to the first, it is doubtful
whether any court today can accurately say that there is a policy in the
forum which would justifiably warrant the nonrecognition of a status of
legitimacy acquired in another jurisdiction. But conceding that such a
position has been taken by several courts, it may still be argued that there
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is no sound principle supporting such nonrecognition merely because the
status of legitimacy was created under a conflicting foreign law, and
indeed, none has been suggested. The second instance of unfavorable
treatment can be avoided, in the usual case, if the forum will character-
ize its own legitimation statute as one of succession as well as status,
thus entitling the forum to apply its own statute where inheritance of
local property is involved. Legitimation results in the creation of a
status which involves a number of legal rights and obligations between
a parent and his child, and one of those rights is that of inheritance.
Thus, if we look to the parts as well as the whole, it is reasonable to con-
clude that a statute of legitimation is not one of status only, but also
one dealing with rights of succession. Such reasoning has been applied in
regard to legitimation by subsequent marriage," 1 by acknowledgment of
paternity,' and by "adoption,"' 03 thus making it unnecessary for the
child to establish complete legitimation according to the law of some other
jurisdiction. In regard to the third area of possible unfavorable treat-
ment in the forum, that of the recognized natural child, the difficulty is
based on the failure of the courts to properly assimilate this civil law
concept into the established common law pattern. Admittedly, such a
child is neither illegitimate nor has he been legitimated. But the status
which he has acquired is most closely akin to the common law concept
of the legitimated child, and he should be granted the rights of such a
child when before the courts of this country.
101. Hall v. Gabbert, 213 Ill. 208, 72 N.E. 806 (1904).
102. Moen v. Moen, 16 S.D. 210, 92 N.W. 13 (1902).
103. In re Lund's Estate, 26 Cal. 2d 472, 159 P.2d 643 (1945).
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